封闭式基金
共同基金
业务
开放式基金
竞争对手分析
基金基金
文件夹
目标日期基金
财务
收益基金
波动性(金融)
货币经济学
经济
机构投资者
营销
公司治理
市场流动性
作者
Christine X. Jiang,Xianzhen Wang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107155
摘要
This study documents the engagement of Chinese mutual fund companies in year-end ranking games, in which they strategically buy and sell stocks substantially held by star funds and their competitors. Non-star funds contribute to approximately half of the buying and almost all selling. Fund companies actively participating in the game can attract more investment flows, but this comes at the cost of distorted relative performance among star funds and heightened return volatility across all involved funds. Furthermore, major holdings of star funds experience return reversals, increased idiosyncratic volatilities, and excessive trading around year-ends. The advent of FinTech platforms in mutual fund distribution amplifies these gaming behaviors.
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