The freedom of crime: property, theft, and recognition in Hegel’s System of Ethical Life

The section on "The Negative, or Freedom, or Crime" is considered by many to be the most important part of Hegel's 1802/3 System of Ethical Life, the one in which Hegel begins to become specifically Hegelian. The reason why this section is so important is because it comprises Hegel's first attempt at systematically integrating 'negativity' or conflict and difference into his framework as an essential, dynamic element, instead of dismissing it as a threat to some alleged ethical unity. But why does Hegel identify freedom with 'the negative', and why are both associated with crime? This paper seeks to answer that question by analysing the roles of possession and property in the System of Ethical Life, the relation to Kant and Fichte's theories of right, and the 'system of need' in general. Among other things, I argue that theft represents a negative assertion of freedom against the abstract norms of recognition governing the exchange of property, an act which ultimately enables more normatively complex modes of interaction to develop.