投标
激励
政治
事前
政府(语言学)
价值(数学)
业务
不完全合同
合同管理
经济
微观经济学
货币经济学
法学
政治学
营销
宏观经济学
哲学
机器学习
语言学
计算机科学
作者
Jonathan Brogaard,Matthew Denes,Ran Duchin
摘要
Abstract This paper provides novel evidence that corporate political influence operates through renegotiations of existing government contracts. Using detailed data on contractual terms and renegotiations around sudden deaths and resignations of local politicians, the estimates show that politically connected firms initially bid low and successfully renegotiate contract amounts, deadlines, and incentives. The effects hold across different industries and contract types, enhance firm value, and persist around the exogenous increase in contract supply due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Overall, this paper establishes an unexplored link between political influence, ex post renegotiations, and ex ante bidding of government contracts.
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