声誉
互惠(文化人类学)
困境
囚徒困境
社会困境
强互惠
微观经济学
计算机科学
网络拓扑
透视图(图形)
数理经济学
重复博弈
博弈论
物理
经济
心理学
社会心理学
人工智能
社会学
数学
操作系统
社会科学
几何学
作者
Yudong Gong,Sanyang Liu,Yiguang Bai
出处
期刊:Physics Letters A
日期:2020-04-01
卷期号:384 (11): 126233-126233
被引量:37
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126233
摘要
Indirect reciprocity is a fascinating topic in the field of social cooperation. In this paper, we propose a novel updating strategy based on the critical reputation-aware calculation. The joint of reputation allows players to make decisions not only on current payoffs but also from a third party, which improves the status of cooperators in the prisoner's dilemma game and provides a possibility for surviving. Experiments show that the discrepancies in initial fitness caused by reputation will support cooperators in occupying a high proportion in communities. Interestingly, we find that the massive scale of reputation fluctuation helps to enhance the cooperative effect, and newly name this character as “quasi-time lag”. The simulations show that the promotion of our proposed mechanism is effective and robust on different network topologies. This work provides a new perspective for the study of the cooperative game.
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