政治风险
内生性
政治
多元化(营销策略)
系统性风险
业务
资本支出
财务
经济
货币经济学
市场经济
营销
政治学
法学
计量经济学
作者
M. Kabir Hassan,Md. Sydul Karim,Tarun K. Mukherjee
摘要
Abstract This study investigates the effects of firm‐level political risk on corporate investments. We find that diversified firms are better able than focused firms in mitigating the impact of idiosyncratic political risk on investments. Diversified firms accomplish this feat via efficient use of the internal capital market that allows segments to alleviate political risk adversity. The effect is working through the channel of exacerbation of financial constraints. When exposed to political risk, diversified firms do not spend more on lobbying and political donations than the focused firms in the subsequent period, implying that diversified firms do not manage political risk politically. Our main findings are robust to a battery of endogeneity tests.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI