内群和外群
信号
规范(哲学)
外群
社会心理学
集体认同
社会认同理论
民族
信号游戏
功率(物理)
身份(音乐)
社会团体
社会学
政治学
心理学
政治
法学
经济
微观经济学
物理
量子力学
声学
作者
Ana Macanovic,Milena Tsvetkova,Wojtek Przepiorka,Vincent Buskens
标识
DOI:10.1098/rstb.2023.0029
摘要
Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practises or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup ‘friends' and outgroup ‘foes', facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes—albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Social norm change: drivers and consequences’.
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