The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach
激励
经济
信号
财务
微观经济学
作者
Stephen A. Ross
出处
期刊:The Bell Journal of Economics [JSTOR] 日期:1977-01-01卷期号:8 (1): 23-23被引量:3026
标识
DOI:10.2307/3003485
摘要
The Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevancy of financial structure implicitly assumes that the market possesses full information about the activities of firms. If managers possess inside information, however, then the choice of a managerial incentive schedule and of a financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium the inferences drawn from the signals will be validated. One empirical implication of this theory is that in a cross section, the values of firms will rise with leverage, since increasing leverage increases the market's perception of value.