调解
数据库事务
业务
金融体系
货币经济学
商业周期
交易成本
经济
财务
宏观经济学
计算机科学
程序设计语言
作者
Patrick Bolton,Xavier Freixas,Leonardo Gambacorta,Paolo Emilio Mistrulli
摘要
We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, allowing them to provide loans to profitable firms during a crisis. Because of the services they provide, operating costs of relationship banks are higher than those of transaction banks. Relationship banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation lending at more favourable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers’ default, we test the theoretical predictions of the model. Received July 29, 2014; accepted February 20, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.
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