Trust, Confidence, and Expertise in a Judge-Advisor System

The relationship between trust, confidence, and expertise in Judge-Advisor Systems is examined in two experiments with Judge-Advisor pairs, one with strangers and another with participants in ongoing relationships. There was expertise asymmetry so that Judges had less expertise than their Advisors. The dyads could receive money for accurate Judge decisions. Either the Judge or Advisor had the power to allocate this money between dyad members, before task interaction in study one and after task completion in study two. Because Judges were more dependent on Advisors than vice versa, it was predicted that trust would be more important to Judges. Results were supportive. Judges had higher and more variable ratings of trust in their partner than did Advisors, suggesting that Judges were more motivated to evaluate trust. High confidence by Advisors had a positive impact on Judges' ratings of trust and tendency to follow their advice. Judges' trust in their Advisors was significantly related their taking the advice and being confident in their final decisions. Although participants in study two had higher levels of trust in their partners, they allocated less money to them. The implications for establishing trust are discussed.