彩票
激励
作弊
利用
经济
自然实验
不诚实
人口经济学
劳动经济学
精算学
公共经济学
政治学
心理学
医学
微观经济学
社会心理学
法学
计算机安全
病理
计算机科学
作者
Guillermo Cruces,Martı́n A. Rossi,Ernesto Schargrodsky
出处
期刊:The American economic review
[American Economic Association]
日期:2023-12-01
卷期号:5 (4): 511-526
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1257/aeri.20220550
摘要
We exploit a natural experiment to study the causal link between dishonest behavior and public employment. When military conscription was mandatory in Argentina, eligibility was determined by both a lottery and a medical examination. To avoid conscription, individuals at risk of being drafted had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation, we first present evidence of cheating in medical examinations. We then show that individuals with a higher probability of having cheated in health checks exhibit a higher propensity to occupy nonmeritocratic public sector jobs later in life. (JEL D91, J45, K42, O15)
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