Innovation and profitability following antitrust intervention against a dominant platform: The wild, wild west?

Abstract Research Summary This study examines whether “unblocking” competition through antitrust intervention against a dominant platform can spur complementor innovation in platform ecosystems. Using a novel dataset on enterprise infrastructure software and a difference‐in‐differences design, we examine the relation between the U.S. antitrust intervention against Microsoft (dominant enterprise platform) and subsequent innovation and profitability of infrastructure applications firms (complementors). The data show that innovation among complementors—particularly ones with low market share—soared when the competitive pressure on the dominant platform amplified. However, the profitability of these complementors dropped. Our results contribute to understanding links between competition and innovation in platform ecosystems, as well as the opportunities and threats related to dominant platforms in those ecosystems. Managerial Summary Complementors (apps, services) that are owned by their platforms often have an unfair advantage. Antitrust action challenges the power of such dual platform‐complementors, reasoning that unfair advantage blocks fair competition, and, in turn, reduces firms' incentives to innovate and thus limits consumer choice. We examine whether reducing anticompetitive barriers and platform‐complementors' power revitalizes the platform ecosystem. Using a landmark antitrust case, we find mixed results: while complementors do innovate more, their profits go down. In particular, the low‐share complementors that bring in the most innovation are also the ones that lose the most financially, suggesting that they may have over‐relied on the platform for key assets. To develop a healthy ecosystem in the long run, platform owners may want to resist the temptation to keep complementors weak and instead help support their development to stand on their own.