再制造
补贴
供应链
采购
闭环
利润(经济学)
业务
微观经济学
产业组织
激励
经济
营销
制造工程
市场经济
工程类
控制工程
作者
Bo Gong,Chunming Shi,Xiaodong Li,Jinshi Cheng
摘要
This study investigates the impacts of the purchasing subsidy (PS) and the dismantling subsidy (DS) on a remanufacturing closed‐loop supply chain with a manufacturer and a dismantling firm. We propose two game models, one with the DS and the other without the DS. We find that an increased PS or DS may be unable to enhance the dismantling firm's efforts. The DS reduces the system profit in contrast to the scenario without the DS. Surprisingly, a simultaneous increase in the two subsidies exacerbates the environmental impacts of remanufacturing closed‐loop supply chain.
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