股东
分散注意力
业务
机构投资者
货币经济学
产品(数学)
信息不对称
财务
经济
公司治理
几何学
数学
生物
神经科学
作者
Yueting Li,Jianling Wang,Xuan Wu
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2019.03.024
摘要
We explore how institutional shareholder attention affects firms’ decisions to cut R&D expenses. Prior studies consider the attention distraction of institutional investors as a signal of firms’ loosened monitoring constraints. Consistent with this view, we find that firms with distracted shareholders are more likely to engage in short-term behavior, namely, cutting R&D expenses. We further find that this effect is concentrated in firms with low information asymmetry, few product market competitive threats, few financial constraints, and low CEO ability. Our results suggest that attention is a key resource for institutional shareholders to effectively monitor firms and, hence, reduce managerial myopia.
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