自由裁量权
语言变化
公共服务动机
公务员制度
政府(语言学)
内在动机
公共服务
公务员
服务(商务)
公共经济学
官僚主义
公共办公室
业务
经济
公共关系
政治学
社会心理学
营销
公共部门
心理学
政治
法学
艺术
哲学
文学类
语言学
出处
期刊:Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
[Oxford University Press]
日期:2012-12-18
卷期号:24 (3): 765-794
被引量:122
标识
DOI:10.1093/jopart/mus062
摘要
Increased monitoring, higher wages, and less discretion are some of the generic remedies for corruption. However, these remedies can be expensive, and may reduce bureaucrats' public service effort and increase corruption. A theoretical model shows that extrinsic motivation for public service (e.g., performance pay) can reduce corruption without some of these side effects. Using a unique survey on 800 central government bureaucrats in Korea, this article also provides individual-level micro evidence that is largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that bureaucrats' intrinsic motivation (e.g., public service motivation) is as negatively associated with their corruptibility as extrinsic motivation. Also, bureaucrats' frequent contact with civil organizations is negatively associated with their corruptibility, whereas frequent contact with the media is positively correlated with corruptibility.
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