Evolutionary game model for decarbonization of shipping under green shipping corridor

Abstract The journey of zero-emission shipping has begun. In the context of green shipping corridor, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the government, shipping enterprises and shippers, and analyzes the stability of the game model. Based on the corresponding policy and market environments, a sensitivity analysis of the key parameters is carried out using MATLAB tools. The results show the following: (1) The tripartite strategy will eventually evolve into {government adopts active policy, shipping enterprises respond positively, consignor respond positively}. This evolutionary result is also more consistent with the reality of emission reduction under the high cost of shipping emission reduction today. (2) Government subsidies, social financing, and the increase of carbon price level can lead shipping enterprises to respond positively. (3) Attention should be paid to the idea of decarbonization driven by the demand side, and the power of all parties should be gathered to participate in the decarbonization of shipping to achieve the carbon reduction target as soon as possible.