Anamnesis in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c

Abstract The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence, that what we call learning is really recalling what we already know, is argued for at length in two places. The argument in the Meno concerns our knowledge of necessary truths. Leibniz spoke well of this argument, saying that Plato’s doctrine ‘is very sound provided that it is taken aright and purged of the error of pre-existence’.More recently Professor Vlastos has shown in detail how the Meno brings out the special character of a priori knowledge. The Phaedo argument differs in that it is about our acquisition of concepts rather than of necessary truths. There is also this difference, that the pre-existence of the soul certainly cannot in the Phaedo be treated as a myth or metaphor; the context makes it impossible to see the doctrine of reminiscence as simply making a point about concept formation and not really referring to the passage of time and the recovery of what was already known.