采购
生产力
经济
国家(计算机科学)
质量(理念)
公共经济学
微观经济学
业务
产业组织
宏观经济学
哲学
认识论
算法
计算机科学
管理
作者
Michael Best,Jonas Hjort,David Szakonyi
摘要
Bureaucrats implement policy. How important are they for a state’s productivity? And do the trade-offs between policies depend on their effectiveness? Using data on 16 million public purchases in Russia, we show that 39 percent of the variation in prices paid for narrowly defined items is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations who manage procurement. Low-price buyers also display higher spending quality. Theory suggests that such differences in effectiveness can be pivotal for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common one—bid preferences for domestic suppliers—substantially improves procurement performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats. (JEL D73, H57, H83, L14, P26)
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