斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
微观经济学
质量(理念)
风险中性
风险管理
供应链风险管理
业务
理性
风险分析(工程)
期望效用假设
供应链管理
经济
营销
服务管理
财务
金融经济学
哲学
认识论
法学
政治学
作者
Ping Chen,Bo Li,Huafei Huang
出处
期刊:Rairo-operations Research
[EDP Sciences]
日期:2019-03-29
卷期号:54 (4): 1057-1075
被引量:5
摘要
Literature concerning about the supply chain management problem is usually based on perfect rationality. However, risk preferences have been proved to be an important role which influences managers’ decisions significantly. This paper investigates a risk combination problem under supplier encroachment with different risk preferences players. Assuming that the supply chain players may be risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-taking, we build a Stackelberg game model to explore the optimal decisions and the impact of different risk combinations, respectively. We focus on two scenarios: the consumers perceive uniform quality between the two channels and perceive differentiated quality between the two channels. We find that the retailer always prefers a risk-averse supplier, while the supplier always prefers a risk-taking retailer. But the combination of a risk-averse supplier and a risk-taking retailer is not always beneficial to the whole supply chain. Further, we conduct numerical experiments to explore the risk combinations and the impacts of players’ selfish, aggressive and altruistic behaviors on optimal decisions.
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