投资(军事)
竞赛(生物学)
启动
微观经济学
业务
经济
产业组织
投资决策
生产(经济)
生态学
工商管理
政治
政治学
法学
生物
作者
Robert Swinney,Gérard P. Cachon,Serguei Netessine
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2011-04-01
卷期号:57 (4): 763-777
被引量:118
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1309
摘要
We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established firms and start-ups entering new markets, which have a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when uncertainty is high) or late (when uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. Established firms choose an investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected profits, whereas start-ups make those choices to maximize the probability of survival. When a start-up competes against an established firm, we find that when demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up takes a leadership role and invests first in capacity, whereas the established firm follows; by contrast, when two established firms compete in an otherwise identical game, both firms invest late. We conclude that the threat of firm failure significantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI