Breaking the Mould: Japan´ s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism

The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance under the KoizumiAbe governments has prompted a neorealist argument that Japan is aligning even more closely with the United States in order to balance China. (1) In practice, Japan's strategy for dealing with Chinese power is more complex than simply bandwagoning with the United States, which has been the foundation of its security policy for more than five decades. (2) The shift in Japanese strategy became evident under the Abe administration. Key differences can be discerned in the responses of the governments of Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe to China's rise. Although Prime Minister Abe sought to go even further than Prime Minister Koizumi in strengthening security ties with the United States, (3) the Koizumi administration gave sole priority to the United States, while the Abe administration adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. A stronger US-Japan alliance was complemented by the buildup of much broader and deeper security ties with other countries in the Asia Pacific, with the aim of constructing a containment coalition against the growth of Chinese power. (4) The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Japan's more complex balancing strategy. It should not be viewed in isolation but in concert with other similar initiatives taking place at the same time: parallel overtures to India and the promotion of concepts of security trilateralism (Japan-India-US/Japan-Australia-US) and quadrilateralism (Japan-US-Australia-India), backed by the overt rhetoric of shared values and references to partnerships based on common security interests. These manifestations of Prime Minister Abe's assertive diplomacy and his desire for closer security relations with like-minded states are quite distinct from the multilateral initiatives that have been an enduring feature of Japan's regional policy in the finance, trade and diplomatic spheres. In dealing with China, the Abe government did not just turn to multilateral initiatives as a means of shaping Japan's security environment in Asia. (5) In fact, the burgeoning security ties with countries outside the US-Japan alliance exemplified a minilateral rather than a multilateralist approach, which sought to formalize and regularize security relations among a small number of regional partners and establish a new grouping with a closed rather than open membership. (6) In this respect, the revamping of security ties with other Asia-Pacific states by the Abe government marked a subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. (7) The new approach also had divergent implications for Japan's security relationship with the United States. On the one hand, it reinforced the US alliance where the United States was also an invited player in minilateral frameworks. The Australia-Japan Security Declaration, for example, foreshadowed stronger Japan-Australia-US trilateral security cooperation in the future. On the other hand, the Abe administration's willingness to sign a security declaration with Australia and overt security approaches to India appeared to reflect a desire to take independent steps to shore up Japan's security and exercise more autonomous influence over strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation In March 2007, Japan took the unprecedented step of signing a security declaration with a third country outside the framework of its bilateral alliance with the United States. It was the first security agreement Japan had signed since the 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and signalled a clear departure from Japan's exclusive security bilateralism centring on the United States. The declaration affirmed the existence of a Japan-Australia strategic partnership and committed each nation to close security consultation, enhanced cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, disarmament and peace keeping operations, and the provision of international public goods such as maritime security, and humanitarian and disaster relief. …